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In the early nineties, as George Bush, President of the United States, 
declared the Cold War to be over, many still believed that a new world 
order and a regime of human rights and peace-keeping could be perma-
nently established under the auspices of the United Nations. However, 
in the meantime, shortly before the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights commemorates 60 years of existence in the year 2008, the prom-
ises of an effective and democratically legitimated human rights policy 
have faded considerably. At least three grounds can be offered for this.  
First, the legitimation of a human rights policy that depends on binding 
standards has been discredited more than once. A prominent example is 
a domestic policy carried out against all agreements, often precisely in 
decisive cases without consultation with the United Nations. Second, we 
are confronted with the paradoxical phenomenon that more and more 
states ratify human rights agreements while human rights practices do 
not improve, but in many cases even deteriorate.1 According to the most 
recent studies, if there is any connection at all between ratification and 
the state of human rights, it lies in the fact that with ratification a gain is 
indeed achieved in the international esteem; however, the disregard for 
duties has a barely noticeable or no unfavorable effect at all. Optimism 
regarding world political decisions oriented by human rights is shaken by 
yet a third ground, connected to the previous one. A sort of counter-
human rights movement’ against international human rights regimes, 
composed of African and Asian countries, and countries moulded by Is-
lam, has sprung from agreements and conventions binding according to 
international law. These have undoubtedly put their particularistic im-
print on the more recent human rights accords. 
Against the background of these developments it is more than ever neces-
sary to take seriously the objections of critics, sceptics and despisers of 
universal human rights in the international human rights discourse, and 
to confront them with the arguments of the supporters. The core of the 
present study is the question of the legitimacy of human rights in a world 
distinguished by a hegemonic human rights policy, by processes of trans-
national legal regulation and deregulation, and by a plurality of clashing 
values – in order to come back once again to the three developments 
sketched above.2 To be more precise I will address the following questions: 
how can human rights be grounded in a plural world society? And, if they 
can, what does one thereby appeal to? The answers to these questions will 
decidedly determine which functions human rights play or should play in 
international relations.  
The goal of this article is to reconstruct the arguments brought forward 
in international political discourse and political theory discourse, and to 
present a suggestion for the conditions of a context-sensible foundation 
and juridification of human rights. In this course neither the objections of 
opponents of a universalistic human rights conception are overlooked, 
nor claims to universally valid human rights, equally effective for all hu-
mans, are given up.3 
I proceed in four steps. First, I will briefly characterize the current, pre-
dominant notion of human rights (I). On the basis of this reconstruction, 
I will discuss two models of human rights justification, the ‘Model of Bar-
gaining’ (II) and the ‘Model of Deliberation’ (III), mainly with the inten-
tion of determining which of the two recognizes different convictions 
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most appropriately and, at the same time, identifying those arguments 
that support human rights-violating practises. As we will see, human 
rights are the result of a fair, context-sensible procedure that can, but 
need not be legitimized through shared and generalizable, moral argu-
ments. A just agreement can be reached despite a pluralism of reasons 
only if fair procedural conditions are given. Finally, I will point out that 
human rights understood this way are a political instrument fulfilling 
important functions in international relations (IV). 
 
I. The Predominant Notion of Human Rights 
Human rights activists and some theorists of international law, as well as 
philosophers, are convinced that nowadays there exists one correct hu-
man rights interpretation that rightly claims to be universal. Despite the 
theoretical shortcomings of the natural law approach which has been 
predominant for a long time, there is some continuity between this ap-
proach and today’s predominant idea of human rights. Human rights are 
still described as being characterized by three elements: they are univer-
sally valid (or at least that is what they claim to be); they address the indi-
vidual and not a specific group; and their content is very general. It is be-
cause of these elements that human rights claim to be valid independent 
of future historical developments and cultural diversity (Thomas Pogge 
2002: 52-71.) For others, there is no doubt that this interpretation repre-
sents the typical ‘western’ idea of human rights, based on culturally biased 
notions of reason and the individual, which, moreover, are misused to 
pursue national interests. As a reaction to the dominant human rights 
interpretation, regional human rights declarations, such as the ‘Bangkok 
Declaration’ of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 
‘Banjul Charter’ of certain African countries and the ‘Islamic Declaration’ 
were developed. These declarations highlight the incompatibilities with 
the central concept of human rights, especially their universality and the 
protection and equal treatment of individuals.4 So we are in fact con-
fronted with a variety of interpretations that claim legal and/or moral 
validity. 
At this point, the question arises regarding how, in view of these conflict-
ing interpretations, one can reach a just agreement. Which arguments are 
‘permitted’ and which are not? And what are the criteria by which to 
judge the appropriateness of the arguments offered? Raising these ques-
tions has a long tradition in philosophy after Pierce’s linguistic turn, and 
the assumption is quite common that what is characterized as a ‘good’ 
argument depends on the conditions under which it was raised. In the 
following section I will discuss two models of human rights justification, 
the ‘Bargaining Model’ and the ‘Model of Deliberation’, both of which 
offer different suggestions about fair conditions for the legitimation of 
law.5 Both have in common that they propose ideal legitimation proce-
dures. Furthermore, by definition, they maintain contact with different 
historical and cultural contexts, because, as procedures, they are open to 
all arguments that might arise in a debate. However, the models differ in 
some respects. First, they rely on different normative procedures. Second, 
they accept different kinds of grounds as legitimate in the norm-setting 
process. And third, they vary in the ultimate content and character of the 
agreements they produce. 
 
II. The Bargaining Model 
 
The Bargaining Model begins with the presupposition of irreconcilable 
interpretations and interests. Law-making procedures in the Bargaining 
Model aim towards achieving agreement, but the way thereto is hotly 
contested terrain. Against the background of plural representations of 
justness, the normative space that provides the foundation for the proce-
dure obviously must be narrow. It is only the process itself that requires 
the agreement of the parties – that is why in the end the procedural ar-
rangements turn out to be normatively modest. It is also advisable to 
avoid implanting in the conditions of the procedures and the rules of ar-
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gumentation assumptions that are too starkly moralistic. The equal op-
portunity of the parties to take part and be heard in the law-making proc-
ess belongs to the normative presuppositions of the familiar practice of 
bringing arguments implied in the Bargaining Model. To hear out the 
opinions of the other side – audiatur et altera pars – is a fundamental, 
minimal principle of any form of procedural justice. By now this practice 
has been internationally ‘naturalized’. Thus, one can speak of a universal 
normative principle of fairness with a view to the political practices of the 
‘demands’ of the rights to co-determination, for instance in international 
economic procedures.6 However, threats or constraints are not com-
pletely shut out, that is, not all hypothetical constellations of power are 
excluded.7 Material, but also social resources, as for example the prestige 
of the respective speakers, are allowed, as well as concealed-strategic ar-
gumentations in the name of a professed ‘general’ interest. Excluded, 
however, are all executive measures that are exceedingly arbitrary. The 
appearance of impartiality already suffices as a criterion for legitimation. 
 
Jon Elster has shown that these assumptions come close to political reality 
but not too close to be completely absorbed by power struggles. One can 
see in political debates that both norm-orientated action and strategic 
action are interconnected (Jon Elster 1998). Politics, according to Elster, is 
too complex to be reduced to a matter of efficient regulations and 
economic agreements. The main purpose of many political processes is to 
create living conditions appropriate for all members of society. Getting to 
this point is only possible for an adept perspective that is in the equal 
interest of everybody. Elster illustrates this pattern of deliberative process, 
in which different types of negotiation are combined, with reference to 
the historical constitution-making processes of Philadelphia 1776 and Paris 
1789-1791 (Jon Elster 1998). 
 
Social action is not based solely on strategic utility calculation – that is the 
fact Elster wants to show in his historical analyses and which he thinks 
represents a universal phenomenon. To portray society as the co-
ordination of action on the basis of opportunistic utility calculation 
betrays complete ignorance of the real world. Rather, social action is 
determined through social norms whose appropriateness is not accepted 
because of their effects but because they are justified.8 Norm-oriented 
action that appears in political practice cannot be reduced to action 
oriented towards strategic rationality. A proof for this is that whether 
political deliberation is convincing as acceptable depends very much on 
the degree to which the speaker can show it satisfies the public interest 
and not merely his own interest. As long as the public is inclined to 
endorse ideas that aim at the general interest and to reject blatant self-
interest, strategic action is possible only if it is subtle: ‘The civilizing force 
of hypocrisy’, according to Elster, ‘is a desirable effect of publicity’ (Jon 
Elster 1998: 111). 
 
On the basis of the empirical assumption that normative and 
instrumental-rational types of arguments already shake hands in 
negotiations, the Bargaining Model believes it is able to do without an 
implicit normative pre-eminence of moral arguments. Here the types of 
arguments stand immediately opposed to one another; fair is the deal one 
agrees on under fair procedural conditions in a manageable time-frame. 
What the bargaining parties finally reach is not a consensus on the basis of 
shared grounds, but rather a compromise on which they can agree on 
different grounds. What the parties come to terms on is the best possible 
agreement that can be reached in light of a limited time-frame, 
incomplete levels of information of the participants, and existing 
constellations of power. A compromise is mostly a second-best solution, 
often reached on the basis of reasons they actually do not find convincing; 
but as they know that this agreement is better than none they accept.9 
Thereby it should not be excluded, for instance, that at the end of the 
bargaining regarding (legal) human rights agreements a regional (partial) 
agreement is reached. 
 
To illustrate how under ‘non-ideal’ procedural conditions of the 
Bargaining Model ethical, religious and moral arguments are engaged in 
the process of coming to an agreement, let us look at a debate about 
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women's rights in Pakistan. This is not an imaginary example: after 
Pakistan had ratified the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women) in 1996, a lively public debate 
emerged about what discrimination against women is, what women’s 
rights are and how they can be implemented in an Islamic state. The 
American sociologist, Anita Weiss, describes how women’s groups tried to 
win over the public by offering a not too radical interpretation of the 
Quran (Weiss 2002). 
 
Let us assume then that we have three different interpretations on the 
table. Position 1 argues that men and women in society have different 
roles to fulfil, both very much respected, although according to the Cairo 
Declaration some rights are limited by reference to the Shari’ah. Under 
Shari’ah law, Muslim women are not accorded equal rights with Muslim 
men; it is the men who define women’s responsibilities.10 Position 2 argues 
that men and women are born equal and therefore have the same rights. 
Because of an ongoing discrimination of women, specific rights for 
women are necessary that address the areas of discrimination women 
experience. The equality of men and women, however, is an assumption 
barely prevalent in the Quran. Position 3 points out that women and men 
both have basic responsibilities: men work outside the house and women 
in the home. It is not forbidden for one to do the work of the other. But it 
would work out best when they are permitted to carry out the tasks of the 
other once they have fulfilled their own responsibilities.11 What would 
probably happen in a debate under the conditions of the Bargaining 
Model? Whereas position 1 is rejected by a majority as it ignores Pakistan’s 
obligation to somehow implement women’s rights into the constitution 
completely, position 2 is rejected also as it is too marginally compatible 
with the Quran. Position 3 has under the Bargaining Model the highest 
chance to succeed. It is hooked up with women’s rights, on the one side, 
and on the other it is considered as a progressive interpretation that does 
not violate traditional sentiments too strongly. 
 
What we see by this is that the Bargaining Model is very much restricted. 
There are no arguments left to rebut the third position; rather this 
interpretation of women’s human rights fits perfectly with the 
government’s political strategy and seems to be a welcome compromise 
between diverging opinions by those in power. 
 
Of course, if you want to win the fight, you have to learn about your 
opponents’ strategies and to think about which arguments usually win, 
regardless of whether they will be the ones that pass the test of 
generalization. And sometimes in real political debates it is not helpful to 
argue that women should be treated as equals because they are born equal 
or possess the same cognitive competencies. In their abstraction, these 
claims are not very telling as they are not responsive to a social and 
political context. What the face of discrimination looks like, what 
opponents might say, what a change in law will mean for cultural 
identity, are important questions which cannot be easily sorted out, even 
by the local participants. However, the Bargaining Model cannot identify 
a difference between strategic but generalizable arguments that aim at 
strengthening the autonomous subject on the one side, and strategic 
arguments that aims at improving the standing of the subject but are not 
generalizable, on the other. The third interpretation of a fair division of 
labour between men and women reproduces a traditional notion of 
gender roles in society without assuming an equal right of women to 
articulate their interests and desires in public. The Bargaining Model has 
some other flaws. 
 
It is not possible to demand equal consideration of all participants’ 
arguments since it is accepted that powerful actors have more influence 
than others. This, in turn, means that it is not required of the participants 
to consider what arguments might be a good candidate to be accepted by 
all. The Bargaining Model does not aim at inclusion of all participants and 
by this does not aim at a universalization of arguments. 
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And finally, there is no one critical measure for the evaluation of the 
compromise-building; since law-making procedures are regarded as 
results of bargaining, they may also come about under minimal fairness 
criteria. In bargaining procedures there is no ground not to agree on a 
position that contradicts moral human rights. This is due to a missing 
‘connection’, in this theoretical model, between moral and political 
legitimation. The critical claim of human rights will be completely 
‘absorbed’ by the procedure: in the end the participants can appeal to an 
outcome that mirrors what the majority ‘thinks’. In so doing, normative 
standards are posited that too quickly relinquish the perspective of the 
victims of human rights violations, those who are not in an explicitly 
politically influential position, to the interests of the politically established 
majority. 
III. Deliberative Model 
In contrast thereto, the Deliberative Model12 suggests a constructivistic 
procedure, by which the outcomes of the procedure, as well as the proce-
dure itself, are based on the hypothetical assumption of rational justifica-
tion. On the basis of normative presuppositions, which concern the indi-
vidual procedural conditions and the concept of person, the participants 
arrive at fair agreements through the orderly exchange of arguments.13 
The conception of human rights accepted in the end by all participants 
can be understood as the result of a ‘discursive constructivism’14: the way 
towards the goal, the goal itself, as well as the different stages on the way 
there, are established by all the participants ‘freehandedly’, that is, with-
out having further specifications of content determine the process of re-
ciprocal exchange of arguments. In so doing, the participants stand with 
their feet on the ground of cognitive skills: it is assumed that all engage in 
the practice of arguing and possess adequate capacities to convince other 
parties through the exchange of the grounds of their conception.15 This 
implies – and this assumption holds also in its generality for the Bargain-
ing Model – that by now the ‘habit of argument’ has prevailed most ex-
tensively in the world.16  
The procedure of legitimation is a two-level procedure, where a first step 
of moral justification logically precedes a second step of political justifica-
tion (Jürgen Habermas 1996; Rainer Forst 1999: 151, 1999: 43).17 In the first 
phase, the procedure is located in a moral context. The members of the 
hypothetical community of all human beings agree on those moral prin-
ciples to which they in the end must submit. This includes that principles 
formulate conditions of norm-setting as well as norms (and moral rights), 
which are also the result of the discursive practise. Within the argumenta-
tive practise, all reasons are acceptable if they fulfil the following two cri-
teria (Rainer Forst 1999a: 44): First, they must be ‘reciprocally non-
rejectable’ (Thomas Scanlon), which means they must be agreeable on 
the basis of insight. This would prevent an author of a rule from demand-
ing anything he or she would never submit to because he or she in fact 
finds the rule to be useless or inadequate. Therefore, part of the concep-
tion of a person within this model is that – along with being capable of 
adopting the perspective of the other – he or she must have a sense of 
justice that makes it clear that oppressing or dominating others is socially 
unacceptable. Secondly, reasons must be general, which means that they 
must be addressed to everyone who may be affected by the norms or by 
the actions that follow from those norms. Only those who have been the 
author of a rule are required to submit to it. The two criteria together 
make for a fair justification procedure. Forst calls this a ‘basic right to jus-
tification’ (Rainer Forst 1999a: ibid). This very basic moral principle allows 
every individual a veto towards all reasons she finds unacceptable accord-
ing to the two criteria, and it obliges all participants to publicly explain 
proposals and actions. The right to justification is itself a normative pre-
supposition that one cannot forego.18 That means that agreements on the 
rules of procedure must also meet the normative assumptions of recipro-
cal justification. 19  
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The second phase of legitimation requires a change of perspective: 
through the morally justified principles, the constructivist procedure is 
placed within the context of a political community of law. As a result, it is 
no longer the aim to come to an agreement on moral principles, but in-
stead to arrive at a consensus on the political ‘basic structure’ (John 
Rawls), i.e., on the rights and other political rules that enable people to 
live together. The procedure is identical with the one for moral principles, 
but in addition to moral reasons, other reasons that reflect the social and 
political conditions are allowed (Rainer Forst 1999: 48.) 
One could object that with this approach it is only fair that a (hypotheti-
cal) consensus regarding legal human rights should narrowly fail on the 
international plane due to the normatively demanding criteria that must 
be fulfilled in order to achieve a fair agreement. An agreement on this 
normative basis will not find the support of those philosophical traditions 
thoroughly human rights-friendly that stand sceptically opposed to deon-
tological morality, for example, rule-utilitarianism. In addition, such ap-
proaches that indeed fundamentally undertake a defence of human 
rights, though not, however, relating to reason but instead to human 
need, mercy or sensibility, will not be advocated. These approaches offer 
grounds with which the list of human rights framed in the Universal Dec-
laration can be supported, for example in relation to shared human needs 
or sensibility concerning human suffering. Yet none of them would pass 
the ‘generalization test’ since the participants cannot be convinced of this 
conception in the same manner and agree on shared grounds. 
However, this objection cannot really affect the interpretation advocated 
here. For, this interpretation avoids the difficulties mentioned without 
giving up a critical normative standpoint. Here, namely, is a fair agree-
ment that at the end of a dispute has come about under fair procedural 
conditions. Indeed the result reached by the participants in the discourse 
is still legitimate if it is not a matter of consensus on the basis of shared 
grounds, but rather the participants agree on different grounds, and 
which suggests speaking here of ‘pluralism of grounds’.20 Those are, how-
ever, in each case the best grounds at their disposal; they are accepted by 
them and are fitted into their other beliefs. They are their ‘first choice’. At 
the same time, the outcome on which they agree likewise corresponds to 
their conceptions and presents the best solution for them, to which they 
agree out of conviction. Hence, this polygenic grounding variation, which 
admits different grounds, is significantly distinguished from a unanimous 
consensus (the latter is essentially easier to reach since it can achieve 
agreement from the perspective of comprehensive theories). It is nonethe-
less a ‘stable’ agreement since the outcome is a good choice for all partici-
pants. At the same time, the polygenic grounding variant is significantly 
different from compromise, which in contrast – at least for some partici-
pants normally the second best variant – oftentimes has resulted on the 
basis of arguments the participants do not find convincing, but which 
they nonetheless invoke since an alternative or even no agreement in the 
outcome would be worse for them. 
 
The pluralism of grounds is a decisive element of human rights justifica-
tion. Interpretations of law under deliberative conditions are not only 
open to the grounds of other, locally rooted positions that want the same; 
they are also in principle open to revision. In other words, they are con-
text-sensible. With each renewed opening of the debate exists the possibil-
ity of converging on the actual ‘correct’ interpretation, that is, the one 
that embodies universalizable interests and on which all can agree.21 
 
Let us again turn to the example of women’s rights in Pakistan and see 
what difference the Deliberative Model makes. The participants involved 
in the deliberative process have to offer reasons acceptable by all the oth-
ers, and secondly, all those affected by the results need to be the authors 
of these norms. This requires of all parties that they take up the perspec-
tive of all parties involved. We can imagine that under this condition nei-
ther position 1 nor position 3 passes the legitimation test. The first inter-
pretation is rejected because it excludes women from the very first when it 
comes to determine the tasks of men and women in society. The third 
interpretation is not open for redefining gender roles but acts on the as-
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sumption that societal roles are fixed forever. This neglects the voices of 
those who may be critical about these beliefs. I think it is difficult to reject 
the third position. Doing so would require giving reciprocally shared rea-
sons why not everybody who is affected should have an equal chance to 
define gender roles and human rights. This claim cannot be denied to 
anybody. 
 
In the Deliberative Model the interpretation of legal human rights is ori-
ented towards the one correct interpretation of moral human rights. 
However, although it does not coincide with it, there is, on the one hand, 
a critical measure for the evaluation of the procedures, the political insti-
tutions and the outcomes; and on the other, political elbow-room for 
interpretations. Whereas in the Bargaining Model the danger consists in 
that the limits of the law-making procedures that disinterestedly face the 
approach of the participants, and those at the end of which stands an 
agreement based on the comprehension of the correct moral principles, 
become blurred, this is not the case in the version of the different grounds 
for the agreement on a generalizable result. 
 
The struggle to gain rights arises at the local level, set off by the experi-
ence of injustice and struggles against oppression, and by the pursuit of a 
more adequate interpretation of human rights. On the other hand, al-
ready existing legally binding international agreements, their interpreta-
tion and implementation, can influence the understanding of human 
rights elsewhere, as in the case of Pakistan. The interpretation of human 
rights sometimes begins locally, triggered off by newly experienced viola-
tions, and later appeals to international agreements. The debate on hu-
man rights is characterized by an interplay between universal and local 
interpretations, as well as between international and local political re-
quirements. 
However, one could object that the deliberative model has some severe 
flaws. One oft-raised objection is that the concept of the individual is pre-
sumed in this model even though it is not compatible with the ‘Asian’ 
ideal of acting responsibly towards the community, nor is it compatible 
with community-focused practices in some African cultures.22 Moreover, 
the legal form of human rights itself prescribes an individualistic perspec-
tive incompatible with these traditions.23 
It would be a misunderstanding to claim that the deliberative legitimation 
model contravenes the idea of community and presuppose a self-
interested self. Rather, the deliberative model describes people as having 
the ability to see other people’s points of view and to interact on a recipro-
cal basis 24 – necessary preconditions for social interaction. To deny people 
the chance to get their voices heard and to express their point of view is to 
deny them a fundamental right: the right to justify one’s position and, in 
turn, to ask for a justification from those in power and who may be re-
sponsible for oppression and unjust rules. Nobody can be deprived of this 
‘right to justification’ with good reasons. Moreover, to stress the impor-
tance of the community ignores the important social condition of 
‘pluralism’ within and among societies. The ‘fact of pluralism’ is a rather 
‘realistic’ assumption as a basis for justifying transnational principles.25  
Human rights as in the deliberative approach, say some other critics, are 
‘Western’ achievements that have come to the fore through the ‘Occiden-
tal’ idea of reason, but which can bring about its own contradictions and 
trigger unwanted effects. Whereas on the one side reason stands for the 
inclusion of all those endowed with reason, it has always disguised the 
exclusion of parts of the population, and worse, it has at times facilitated 
colonization and oppression in the name of alleged civilization.26 Another 
aspect, namely the critique of reason through reason, also has a long tra-
dition within Western philosophy. Martin Heidegger and later Richard 
Rorty defined what one can call an ‘abstractive fallacy’.27 Reason, origi-
nally based on Platonic thinking, ‘forgets’ its own local context of emer-
gence by claiming universal validity, thereby ignoring that every historical 
or cultural context has its own ideas of what makes an action right or 
wrong. The practice of reason-giving, defenders say, is an integral part of 
communicative action, which itself rests on the idea of reciprocal com-
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municative relations (Jürgen Habermas 2002: 212.) In international human 
rights discourse, participants who aim at a common understanding of 
interpretations have to orient their actions according to certain presuppo-
sitions. Among them is the idea of symmetrical relations between partici-
pants, which is expressed through reciprocal respect and taking over the 
perspective of others as well as the willingness to see one’s own tradition 
from the perspective of the other (Jürgen Habermas 2002: 213). Taking 
these normative assumptions into consideration, it is possible to track 
down injustice in every cultural context; they undermine the normative 
preconditions that have to be fulfilled to come to a consensus. 
IV. Final Consideration: The Function of Human Rights 
In conclusion, it can be held that for the context-sensible human rights 
approach advocated here the discord over human rights is an integral part 
of the theoretical program, unlike perhaps as would occur with a natural 
law position. Controversies over how inclusion must look are reflected in 
irreconcilable beliefs regarding human rights. The grounding situation is 
‘impartial’ since in the shared practices of justification it permits all argu-
ments for and against human rights. Thereby it always already presup-
poses an individual demand for accountability. To abandon this demand 
itself would mean to misconceive the idea of human rights understood as 
lending a voice to the weakest vis-à-vis those in power. No conception of 
human rights can slide back without being delivered beyond recognition. 
Hence it is also misleading to say that human rights are ‘neutral’ since 
they do not rest on shared values and norms, produced through the re-
constructive method of inter-cultural comparison. They seem to be char-
acterized more suitably as a normative political instrument that aims to-
wards inclusion. Inclusion itself is an ideal that in the global public sphere 
will be more and more difficult to reject. 
However, what does this mean for the function of human rights in inter-
national politics? A conception of human rights that satisfies current in-
ternational relations is confronted with at least four tasks. First, human 
rights formulate political goals for the development of all societies. For 
this reason they potentially compete with international regulations con-
cerning economic and finance relations, as well as other political relations 
among states and between states and international organizations. Second, 
moral human rights apply limits to the constitutions of states and to their 
other internal social regulations, as well as to international organizations 
(even to trans-national companies). These constitutional guidelines can 
pertain for instance to religious freedom and gender equality, but also to 
the adherence to social standards. Third, human rights are a measure that 
can give information as to the legitimacy of the political order of a state 
and, beyond that, of the international system of regulations. Human 
rights are a form of political critique. This is directed towards intra-
societal, trans-national or intermediate states of affairs that make difficult 
or impossible an unhindered access to the resources to which one has a 
claim by means of human rights. Poverty, for instance, is not only an un-
bearable and also humiliating state for those affected. For purposes of so-
cial and economic human rights, it can also be criticized as deficient insti-
tutional infrastructure, whose negative effects prevent access to vital re-
sources. 
 
Fourth, finally, human rights formulate a concern that can be under-
stood in its universality by all humans, regardless of the culture they be-
long to and the language they speak: they are directed against arbitrary 
rule and demand social inclusion in a political society and the implemen-
tation of the institutions connected to this membership. The demand for 
human rights is understood all over the world, for they speak the lan-
guage of the oppressed. They are placeholders for the public condemna-
tion of indignities, abuses, and injuries that humans force on other hu-
mans. Political human rights lend authority to the right to a public the-
matization of oppression. Human rights commit state representatives, 
citizens, and all other (international and trans-national) actors to estab-
lish policies that make membership possible. This also prevents human 
beings from remaining without virtual legal protection, thus avoiding 
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being held in detention centres or having to toil under degrading circum-
stances. The lack of rights itself is a human rights violation.  
 
Human rights are the most appropriate norms we possess when we speak 
of inclusion. They formulate the institutional conditions that must be 
fulfilled for humans to be treated as equal members of a society. An im-
portant element of this membership is that the needs and interests are 
reflected in an adequate manner in the social institutions – both in the 
process of decision making, in the decision as regards content itself, as well 
as in its implementation. Membership is thereby not limited to a determi-
nate territory, but can possess a regional or global dimension beyond a 
territorially defined political order. The scope of the membership is de-
pendent on the affectedness through economic, financial, and political 
systems. Therein already lies the strength of this approach: the principle 
of affectedness is inclusive and prepares the ground for the political, social, 
and cultural membership on the basis of a possible or factual subjection to 
institutions. 
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1 For this see the comprehensive studies by, among others, Emilie Hafner-Burton and 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui 2005, Oona A. Hathaway 2002 and Andrea Liese 2006; see also the 
contribution by Anja Jetschke 2006 
2 This article is based on my book Globale Politik und Menschenrechte, published in 
February 2008. 
3 The juridification of human rights means here first and foremost ‘legal 
regulation’. Thereby ‘juridical’ human rights are distinguished from ‘moral’ 
human rights that have not or have not yet been converted into legal form. The 
expression ‘legal’ human rights, which perhaps could be offered instead of 
‘juridical’, contains a semantic closeness to ‘legalization’ or ‘legalize’, thereby 
having the connotation of expressing a demand for a legitimate legal claim. 
However, we will explicitly distinguish here between legality and legitimacy; a 
legal claim can be legal but not legitimate. The term ‘juridification’ or ‘juridical 
rights’ leaves the question of legitimacy also semantically completely open for 
the time being. For the distinction between legality and legitimacy see Jürgen 
Habermas 1996; for the concept of ‘juridification’ see Bernhard Zangl 2006 and 
Kreide/Niederberger 2008. 
13 Krisis 
   Journal for contemporary philosophy                                                       Regina Kreide – Power and Powerlessness of Human Rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
4 The Bangkok Declaration, together with the other two, share the fact that they empha-
size obligations instead of rights, group rights and the protection of the family instead of 
claims of the individual, and, moreover, they underscore the importance of social rights 
by neglecting civil and political rights. Furthermore, they stress the ‘right to develop-
ment’, which demands fair international trade relations among states – a right that 
addresses collectives and not individuals 
5 The distinction between the two models is based on an ideal-typical reconstruction of 
different but similar approaches. For the Deliberative Model see Jürgen Habermas 1996 
(1992); 1996a; Frank Michelman 2000; Rainer Forst 1999, 1999a. For the Model of Fair 
Bargaining see Jon Elster 1989, 1998; Stuart Hampshire 1999; Ingeborg Maus 1995; John 
Rawls 1993 and, although different in many respects, Jon Elster 1989; 1998. Similarities 
and differences with respect to the legitimation of rights in the theories of Ingeborg Maus 
and Jürgen Habermas have been very clearly presented by Peter Niesen 2002. 
6 See also Stuart Hampshire 1999: 27, 77. 
7 The threat can thereby be exerted also with an eye on the public: ‘When you suggest 
curtailing the job protection in this way, then I cannot guarantee that the trade union 
workers will not strike’. 
8 Examples of social norms shared among all members of a society are ‘respect for human 
dignity’ and the ‘prohibition of cannibalism’.  
9 A further type of agreement could be called the ‘polygenic compromise’: even though 
people can stick by their overall convictions and thus keep their ‘first choice’ reasons, the 
result does not express their first priority. Think of someone who defends a theory of 
needs and someone who is in favor of a neo-liberal theory, both wanting to come to an 
agreement on social security measures. They may agree that some basic subsistence is 
necessary for the poor. From a need-perspective this satisfies the idea that people who 
have needs and cannot satisfy them should get subsistence, whereas from the point of 
view of a neo-liberalist, supporting the poor helps to stabilize social peace. For the first 
party (need-theory), however, the measure does not go far enough, whereas for the 
second it already demands too much. So the result is a compromise (second best option 
for both), but they agree on the basis of their very own first order convictions.  
10 This position is explicated in the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam. In this 
document all rights are seen as derived from God. Recently (March 2008), it has become 
more or less impossible for NGOs to discuss topics such as genital mutilation, forced 
marriage and stoning with the UN Human Rights Council. Representatives of Pakistan 
and Egypt intervened immediately, barring the participants from a debate about Shari’ah 
issues. Louise Arbour, former commissioner of the Council expressed her concerns about 
this development. For a written statement by some NGOs see: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/111/27/PDF/G0811127.pdf?OpenElement. 
For the Cairo Declaration see: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ 
cairodeclaration.html. There is comprehensive literature on this topic. Let me mention 
three: Mayer (1991) denies the historical roots of human rights in Islam whereas 
Bielefeldt (1998) draws on similarities with Christian essentialism. For a critical approach 
from within the Quran, see Mernissi 1993 and Mahmoud Bassiouni 2008.  
11 This was indeed the position of the director of the New Islamic Institute for Women in 
Islamabad, Farhat Hashmi, who offers an interpretation of women’s rights, derived from 
Islam, that seems strange to most of us. See Anita Weiss 2002. Also, much effort has 
already been undertaken to derive context-specific notions of freedom, autonomy and 
individual choice out of the diversity of ‘Asian value systems.’ In the complex ideas of 
Confucius, for example, nobility of conduct has to be achieved in freedom, and in the 
Indian tradition one can find a variety of views on freedom, tolerance and equality 
(referring to the writings of Emperor Ashoka). The hope of some human rights theorists 
and activists is that a comprehensive political consensus can be reached by a local 
reconstruction of values that might pass the inter-cultural test of political agreement. 
Inoue Tatsuo 1999: 52. 
 
12 Here I refer above all to Jürgen Habermas’ theory of law, which has significantly shaped 
the concept of ‘deliberative politics’. Habermas has worked out his ideas on the 
legitimacy of law for the democratic state of law in Between Facts and Norms (1996). 
Later works, which deal with, among others, the legitimacy of international law, are 
more demure with regard to the normative presuppositions. In The Postnational 
Constellation (Habermas 2001, above all pp. 164-167) Habermas suggests two criteria that 
at a minimum should be fulfilled: the rationality of processes of communication and 
decision, and the transparency of the processes of decision. Nevertheless, one can assume 
that the criterion persists, according to which on an international plane the outcomes of 
a legally binding human rights convention should not run counter to moral human 
rights. 
13 See Rainer Forst, whose approach diverges in many ways from that of Habermas. 
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14 Rainer Forst 1999a, p. 85 und 1999: 152. 
15 The discourse model was criticized since, due to its emphasis on cognitive assumptions, 
children, the mentally challenged, and animals possess no rights and cannot be 
considered full-fledged discourse participants given their lack of competence. See 
Angelika Krebs 1999: 349. 
16 See also Stuart Hampshire 1999: 37, who speaks of the ‘habit of playing the game of 
argument’. Nonetheless, he adds that the rules of the game might in each case turn out 
otherwise locally. 
17 Frank Michelman distinguishes also between moral and political justification of human 
rights in Michelman 2000.  
18 Whereas in Forst's theory the principle of justification is of a moral nature, the very 
similar discourse principle in the theory of Habermas is based on a notion of reason.  
19 The principle of justification is a (transcendental) principle of reason, which cannot be 
justified without committing a ‘performative self-contradiction’ (Karl-Otto Apel). The 
question ‘Why be reasonable in this practical way?’ asks after the reason for giving reasons 
and presupposes what it asks for. The recourse to other authorities does not help either 
as the same question of legitimation occurs again. Rainer Forst 1999b: 192.  
20 For the concept of ‘pluralism of grounds’ see also Peter Niesen 2002: 44. 
21 Thus, for example, Hauke Brunkhorst, who refers to the fact that human rights 
without democracy can be neither interpreted, nor protected and altered: ‘Anything else 
amounts to a mixture of paternalism and arbitrariness’ (1999: 173ff.). 
22 See, for example, Rhoda Howard 1990: 159-184. At this point it is worthwhile noting 
that a similar argument has been given by the so-called ‘communitarians’. They criticize 
– from within ‘Western’ discourse – the dominant liberal Western idea of a person, 
which expresses the possessive, individualistic striving for freedom of the individual. The 
‘unencumbered self’ (Michael Sandel 1982) carries out actions according to rational 
calculation and neglects social ties and solidarity with others. See for the defence of the 
virtues in a ‘Confucian’ society Raimundo Pannikar 1982. 
23 This is also the interpretation of Charles Taylor who refers to a reformistic articulation 
of Theravada Buddhism. Taylor discusses the movement of the late Phutthathat 
(Buddhadasa), who tried to purify Buddhism by turning it away from rituals around 
heaven, hell, gods and demons, and focusing it on Enlightenment. Enlightenment here 
not only means to be concerned with one’s own liberation, but also with that of others. 
Charles Taylor 1999:124-147. See also Sulak Sivaraksa 1992. 
24 For Michael Walzer, often misleadingly named a ‘communitarian’, the liberal self is not 
a pre-social but a post-social self. Michael Walzer 1990: 21.  
25 For a criticism of John Rawls’ Law of Peoples see Kreide 2002.  
26 Poor workers, women, blacks, gypsies, and children were long excluded from the 
community of rights bearers. The rights of asylum seekers, homosexuals, and animals 
are still highly contested in Western countries. And the concepts of ‘civilizing missions’ 
and – already – ‘humanitarian interventions’ were used to legitimize the imperialistic 
politics of powerful Western states from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth 
century. Onuma Yasuaki 1999: 105; see also Jörg Fisch 1984; Norman Paech/Gerhard 
Stuby 2001: 102.  
27 For this expression see Jürgen Habermas 2002: 204; Richard Rorty 1993. 
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